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REMEDIES
INTRODUCTION
For many years the legal status of agreements to arbitrate
has been unclear in Kentucky.' Therefore, the most significant
Kentucky Supreme Court decision in the past year regarding
the law of remedies was Fite & Warmath Construction Co. v.
MYS Corp.,2 which dealt with the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. Arbitration has not been traditionally classified as
a remedy, but rather a private means of dispute settlement
which is agreed upon by the parties in a contract.
3
"Functionally, however, arbitration often operates as a remedy
for disputes, misunderstandings, and even for breach, and the
arbitrator may award a money recovery for the breach or even
in some jurisdictions relief that, were it given by a court, would
be classed as equitable."' This article deals primarily with the
impact of the Fite & Warmath decision on Kentucky arbitra-
tion law and its federal significance with respect to the applica-
tion of the United States Arbitration Act.5 In addition, two
other recent Kentucky Court decisions in the area of remedies
are treated briefly in the final section of the article.
Fite & Warmath involved a dispute over a future arbitra-
tion clause' in a contract for construction of a shopping mall
.See Goldman, A Proposed Arbitration Act for Kentucky, 22 ARB. J. 193, 208-09
(1967).
2 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).
3 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.2, at 798 and § 12.27, at 935 (1973).
It [arbitration] is a process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes
to an impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by them for a decision
based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before the arbitration
tribunal. The parties agree in advance that his determination, the award,
will be accepted as final and binding upon them.
M. DOMKE, THE LAw AND PRA T E OF COMMERcIAL ARBITRATON § 1.01, at 1 (1968).
D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 798. Arbitration awards are often preferred over
judicial proceedings because arbitration allows for speed, privacy, fewer expenses and
greater flexibility of remedy. Id. at 936.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
Arbitration agreements fall into two basic types: (1) an agreement to submit a
present controversy to arbitration, and (2) an agreement to submit any controversy
which may arise in the future to arbitration. 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award §
11 (1962). The latter are also referred to as future disputes clauses. K. SEIDE, A Dic-
TIONARY OF ARBITRATION AND ITs TERMS 100 (1970).
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in Kentucky. Fite & Warmath, a Tennessee corporation,
agreed to act as general contractor for MYS, a Kentucky corpo-
ration completely owned by New York residents. 7 After a series
of disputes the parties terminated their relationship. MYS filed
a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation pursuant to the contract, while Fite & Warmath filed
suit in circuit court to enforce a mechanics and materialman's
lien against MYS. The circuit court stayed its proceedings
pending completion of the arbitration and later entered the
arbitration award against Fite & Warmath as the judgment of
the court.' Fite & Warmath appealed, claiming the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's
ruling that the future arbitration clause in the contract was
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act,' and that Ken-
tucky courts were bound to apply the Act in cases involving
interstate commerce.10 To appreciate the significance of these
dual rulings it is first necessary to understand the nature and
history of arbitration in Kentucky and under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.
I. KENTUCKY LAW ON ARBITRATION OF FUTURE DISPUTES
A. The Common Law Rule
Kentucky court decisions on arbitration, prior to Fite &
Warmath, can fairly be categorized as dated" and ambiguous."2
However, the Kentucky common law rule'3 derived from these
Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Ky. 1977).
Id. at 732.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
0 559 S.W.2d at 733-35.
" See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham & Gentry, 76 S.W. 22 (Ky.
1903); Ison v. Wright, 55 S.W. 202 (Ky. 1900); Gaither v. Daugherty, 38 S.W. 2 (Ky.
1896).
12 See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallandingham & Gentry, 76 S.W. 22 (Ky.
1903), where an agreement to arbitrate the amount of damages as a prerequisite to suit
was enforced, despite the Court's use of language similar to that found in the prior
cases invalidating other arbitration agreements. The Court found that agreements to
arbitrate controversies of law were impermissible, but that agreements to arbitrate
purely factual issues-here the amount of damages-were enforceable. Id. at 24.
,1 The general common law rule was subject to numerous exceptions which com-
plicated application of the rule. One such exception, arbitration to determine facts, is
[Vol. 67
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cases by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was quite clear: "It
is the law in Kentucky that an agreement between the parties
to a contract to arbitrate all of the disputes thereafter to arise
thereunder is invalid and unenforceable ... .
By refusing to enforce future arbitration agreements Ken-
tucky courts followed the vast majority of courts in this country
and in England which have held such agreements unenforcea-
ble because they were against public policy and "oust the
courts of their jurisdiction."15 Although the Kentucky courts
have repeatedly stated that it is their policy to favor dispute
settlement by means of arbitration,"8 such arbitration has been
prohibited in cases involving future arbitration agreements.
Therefore, prior to Fite & Warmath an arbitration agreement
was enforceable only when the agreement was made after a
litigable dispute existed, and not when the agreement involved
arbitration of potential, future disputes.
B. The Arbitration Statutes
Although at common law most states refused to enforce
future arbitration agreements, a great majority of the states
now provide for their enforcement by statute. At least thirty-
five states currently have statutes which provide for the en-
forceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 7 New
York's 1920 arbitration law initiated the trend of enforceabil-
discussed supra at note 12. More significantly, only agreements to arbitrate future
disputes were unenforceable.
"1 Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1944). The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied this Kentucky rule even though it was highly critical of the
Kentucky courts' adherence to the policy of refusing to enforce such such arbitration
agreements. Id.
11 This phrase was used by the Kentucky Court in Continental Ins. Co. v. Vallan-
dingham & Gentry, 76 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Ky. 1903). See 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arbitration and
Award § 36 (1962); M. DOMKE, supra note 3, at § 3.01.
11 Goldman, supra note 1, at 193. See, e.g., Smith v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 253
S.W.2d 629, 630 (Ky. 1952).
11 G. GOLDBRo, A LAwYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.02 (1977). The
states which have such statutes are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Id. at n.9.
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ity. This movement soon predominated due to the passage of
the United States Arbitration Act in 1925 and the adoption of
the Uniform Arbitration Act in twenty states."8
Kentucky has had a series of arbitration acts between 1795
and the present.19 However, none of these acts have provided
for the enforcement of future arbitration agreements. In fact,
the current arbitration statute, Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) § 417.010, can be interpreted to prohibit enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes. The statute provides:
Any controversy that might be the subject of an action
may be submitted, by written agreement of the parties to the
controversy, to one (1) or more arbitrators for decision, or to
two (2) arbitrators with provisions for an umpire to be se-
lected by the two (2) arbitrators if they disagree. The agree-
ment of submission shall be binding on the parties thereto if
it states the matter submitted and who are to be the arbitra-
tors.2"
This statute seems to refer exclusively to arbitration of an
existing controversy for two reasons. First, the statute refers to
the agreement as an "agreement of submission," the term used
for agreements to arbitrate existing disputes.2' Thus KRS §
417.010 seemingly provides only for contractual submission of
existing disputes to arbitration while KRS § 417.01122 provides
for judicial submission of such disputes. Second, KRS §
417.020, in providing a form for submission agreements, re-
11 Notes and Comments, Arbitration: Enforceability of Future Commercial Arbi-
tration Agreements in Oklahoma, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 187, 192-93 (1977).
' For the history and a discussion of Kentucky's series of arbitration acts see
Goldman, supra note 1, at 203-04.
' KY. REv. STAT. § 417.010 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The procedure for
judicial submission of controversies to arbitration is found in KRS § 417.011 (1972).
11 W. STURGES, CoMMERcIALARBrRATONS AN AWiARDS §§ 13,67 (1930); M. DoMKE,
supra note 3, at 31.
= KRS § 417.011 (1972) provides:
any controversy which is or might be the subject of an action may, at the
request of those interested therein, be submitted to the decision of one (1)
or more arbitrators, or to two (2) and their umpire, by the order of any court
having jurisdiction of the subject. The parties making such submission shall,
if there be no action pending, by written agreement filed and noted on the
record, or by an entry on the record, state what question is submitted. The
order of court shall state the time in which the award is to be made and
returned, but the court may enlarge the time.
[Vol. 67
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quires a statement of the matter in controversy and refers to
the parties as "having a controversy, '2 3 suggesting by the use
of the present tense of the participle that the dispute exists at
the time the parties make the agreement.
Even if KRS § 417.010 could be read to extend also to
future arbitration agreements, it would be nearly impossible
for such an agreement to comply with the terms of the statute.
At the time of contract negotiation, when future arbitration
clauses are formulated, the parties probably would not know
the specific nature of disputes which could arise.Y Therefore,
even if future arbitration agreements are permissible under the
statute, the statute seems to impose an insurmountable draft-
ing obstacle:
Unless the parties are permitted under the existing statute to
state the matter in question in the broadest possible terms,
it is likely that at the time they draft a future disputes clause
they will not be able to predict the precise nature of the
controversy which might arise in the future. Accordingly,
they will not be able to satisfy the Act's requirement that the
matter submitted be expressly stated in the agreement.2
The Kentucky courts have never considered the specificity
2 KRS § 417.020 (1972). This section reads as follows:
The form of the submission agreement shall be substantially as follows: "We,
- and _, having a controversy respecting - (here in-
sert matter in controversy), for the purpose of settling it, have mutually
chosen - as arbitrator, (or have mutually chosen - and
-as arbitrators, who shall choose an umpire in case of disagreement).
We hereby bind ourselves to perform their written award. In witness whereof
we have hereunto set our hands this - day of - , 19_."
Arbitration agreements not conforming to this statutory form may nevertheless be
valid common law arbitration. Miller v. Plumbers Supply Co., 122 S.W.2d 477 (Ky.
1938); Modem System Bakery v. Salisburg, 284 S.W. 994 (Ky. 1926). However, this
would not help future arbitration agreements which are invalid at common law. See
supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of future arbitration agree-
ments at common law.
214 Future disputes clauses are generally very broadly phrased, as the clause in the
contract between Fite & Warmath and MYS illustrates:
7.10.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or
relating to this Contract or the breach thereof, . . . [certain exceptions]
shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.
Quoted in Fite & Warmath Constr. Co., 559 S.W.2d at 731.
"3 Goldman, supra note 1, at 208.
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issue, either in the context of a future arbitration agreement or
when an existing dispute was involved.2e Nor has the Kentucky
Supreme Court ever considered a case where a future arbitra-
tion agreement was sought to be enforced under the provisions
of KRS § 417.010. Therefore, the law in this area is still uncer-
tain. Given this uncertainty, it is not surprising that business-
men and attorneys in Kentucky have used arbitration agree-
ments far less than such agreements have been used in other
states.Y
C. A New Policy?
Despite this background of judicial hostility to future arbi-
tration agreements and uncertainty regarding the application
of the statute, dicta in Fite & Warmath provide a glimmer of
hope for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes. The Court stated that while their decision provided for
the enforceability of a future disputes clause under federal law,
"[w]e do not consider, however, that we are displacing a
viable public policy of this state. ' ' 29 The Court went on to recog-
nize that arbitration has been approved in Kentucky by the
constitution," by the legislature through enactment of the arbi-
' But see Goldman, supra note 1, at 208. See also Aaron, Some Procedural Prob-
lems in Arbitration, 10 vAND. L. REV. 733, 734-38 (1957) on the difficulty of specifying
the issues to be arbitrated even in an existing dispute.
1 In its brief, MYS Corp. did claim that the arbitration award was proper under
KRS § 417.010, however it did not argue the point and the Court did not address it in
the opinion. Brief for Appellees at 25-26, Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp.,
559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977). [The brief is captioned as in the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky because the briefs were filed before the judicial amendment changed the
designation of the highest court to the Kentucky Supreme Court.]
Is See Goldman, supra note 1, at 202, 208-09. However, the American Arbitration
Association reports that the number of A.A.A. arbitration cases from Kentucky has
been slowly increasing from one to two cases ten years ago to six to eight cases cur-
rently. Three reasons were given for this increase: (1) Some parties prefer arbitration
and do not challenge the enforcement of a future disputes clause; (2) some contracts
fall under the Federal Arbitration Act so that future disputes clauses are enforceable;
and (3) some parties enter into submission agreements once the dispute is in existence.
Interview with Phillip Thompson of the American Arbitration Association (Oct. 23,
1978).
" Fite & Warmath Constr. Co., 559 S.W.2d at 734. (emphasis added).
" Ky. CONST. § 250 provides: "It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to
enact such laws as shall be necessary and proper to decide differences by arbitrators,
the arbitrators to be appointed by the parties who may choose that summary mode of
adjustment."
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tration statute, and in some circumstances by the courts. The
Court also noted that the common law prohibition against fu-
ture arbitration agreements has been severely criticized.3 1 Thus
it appears that the Court is reconsidering the antiquated com-
mon law rule and may enforce future arbitration agreements at
some later time.
There are three approaches by which the Court could pro-
vide for such enforcement: (1) overrule prior cases to the con-
trary and announce that agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes are no longer regarded as against public policy; (2)
broadly interpret the Kentucky arbitration statute to mandate
enforcement of future arbitration agreements; or (3) hold that
future disputes clauses are enforceable as a type of "choice of
forum" clause.3" The feasibility of each of these alternatives
must be considered in greater detail.
1. Abandoning the Old Common Law Rule
As previously noted, the cases establishing the rule against
future arbitration agreements are very old, 3 and the policy
justifications for the rule are no longer valid. The reason tradi-
tionally given for not enforcing such agreements is that they are
against public policy because they "oust the courts of their
jurisdiction."3 However, such an agreement does not destroy
the jurisdiction of a court, but simply removes a controversy
from the judicial process, in much the same way as a settle-
ment agreement. 5 In fact, it appears that idealistic considera-
tions of jurisprudence were completely alien from the founda-
tion for the common law rule:
' "The spectre remains, however, of the applicability of the common-law rule
which as a matter of judge-made law prohibits the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate future disputes based on the questionable justification that such agreements
'oust the courts of jurisdiction.' This rationale has not escaped without serious criti-
cism." Fite & Warmath Constr. Co., 559 S.W.2d at 735.
12 Choice of forum clauses are contractual agreements between parties to the effect
that litigation between them will only be brought in a specified forum. Gilbert, Choice
of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1, 2 (1976).
" In fact the most recent Kentucky case on point was decided in 1900. See Ison
v. Wright, 55 S.W. 202 (Ky. 1900).
3 W. STURoS, supra note 21, at 45.
" Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, 296 N.W. 475, 477 (Minn.
1941).
1978-79]
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There is eminent authority (Lord Campbell, in Scott v.
Avery, 25 L.J. [N.S. Exch.] 308), that the rule was the prod-
uct of judicial jealousy rather than judicial reasoning. He said
that it arose in the time when "the emoluments of the Judges
depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees." In those
days they had no fixed salary and so "there was great compe-
tition to get as much as possible of litigation into Westmin-
ster Hall, and a great scramble . . . for the division of the
spoil." In consequence, "they had great jealousy of arbitra-
*tors. .,. . Therefore they said that the Courts ought not to
be ousted of their jurisdiction, and that it was contrary to the
policy, of the law to do so."3
Thus the antiquated common law rule has little basis in
sound legal reasoning, resulting only in inconsistency and un-
certainty. 37 The burgeoning trend toward enforceability of fu-
ture arbitration agreements" demonstrates the widespread dis-
satisfaction With unenforceability. Distinguishing between
agreements to arbitrate current disputes and future arbitration
agreements, as Kentucky has done, results in injustice and
confusion, since the line between the two types of agreements
is .merely a distinction without a difference."
Arbitration agreements covering future disputes should be
enforced in the interest of judicial economy. Private settlement
of disputes relieves crowded, court dockets and lessens the bur-
den of court expenses on the taxpayers. 0 In addition, arbitra-
tion:provides the business community with several advantages
over traditional dispute resolution through litigation. Arbitra-
tion, is less costly than litigation, much faster, more informal,
and it provides for greater privacy for both parties.4" Arbitra-
3 Id.
A general comment to an American Law Reports annotation concluded: "As it
now stands, the case law in regard to the Validity of general arbitration clauses is
confused in statement and theory, poorly reasoned, arbitrary and not well designed to
accomplish a useful purpose." Annot., 135 A.L.R. 59, 91 (1941).
For further criticisms of the common law rule see Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d
876, 881 (6th Cir. 1944); United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing v.
Stine, 351 P.2d 965, 972-78 (Nev. 1960); W. STURGES, supra note 21, at 47.
See Goldberg, The Agreement to Arbitrate, 24 PRACTICAL LAWYER 61 (1978).
" Annot., 135 A.L.R. 59, 91 (1941).
40 See M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8-9 (1965); Notes and Comments,
supra note 18, at 188.
" See D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 936; M. DOMKE, supra note 40, at 8-11; F. KELLOR,
ARBITRATION IN ACTION 14 (1941); Goldman, supra note 1, at 195-96.
[Vol. 67
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tors are often more effective in resolving business disputes than
courts because (1) they are experts in the area of controversy,
and (2) the relief they give is more equitably based on prevail-
ing commercial standards which are within the expectations of
the parties.42 Finally, "[t]o these may be added the belief that
arbitration maintains good will and preserves business friend-
ship." 3 Thus enforcement of future arbitration agreements
seives the best interests of the parties to the dispute, as well
as the general public.
Enforcement of future disputes clauses is essential to the
maximization of the benefits of arbitration. At the time two
parties enter into a contract they may desire to arbitrate any
future disputes. However, if future arbitration clauses are not
enforceable, they must wait until a controversy arises to agree
to submit it to arbitration. When a dispute occurs, though, the
party which anticipates losing by arbitration will often insist
on litigating the dispute in court, not because of any real oppo-
sition to arbitration, but because the cost, and delay of litiga-
tion may discourage the other party from pursuing the matter,
or may hinder the opponent in proving its case.
At least two reasons have been suggested for refusing to
enforce future arbitration agreements. One reason, suggested
during the infancy of organized arbitration, is the danger of
unfairness resulting from a lack of the procedural safeguards of
litigation. However, this "danger has now been greatly dimin-
ished by the establishment of procedures by such organizations
as the American Arbitration Association.' By making use of
the procedures of such organizations the parties can prevent
any unfairness or overreaching. In addition, a party dissatisfied
with an arbitration award may seek to have it modified or
vacated by a court." While the court cannot conduct a de novo
hearing, it can correct violations of -public policy and
"misconduct that violates the basic rights of the parties to a
42 See M. DOMKE, supra note 40, at 9-12.
"F. KELLOR, supra note 41, at 14.
" Notes and Comments, supra note 18, at 193. For the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association see G. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 130.
34.
"5 See generally M. DomKE, supra note 40, at 96-99.
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fair hearing." 6 A second reason is that some future arbitration
agreements result from adhesion contracts where there is an
inequality of bargaining power, or from boilerplate clauses in
contracts. This type of unfairness, however, can be remedied
by application of traditional contract principles and should not
interfere with the enforcement of future arbitration clauses
bargained for in good faith.
In conclusion, future arbitration agreements should be en-
forced in Kentucky, since the policy justifications for the old
common law rule are no longer valid and modern public policy
favors such agreements. Such enforcement need not be man-
dated by the legislature-several appellate courts in states
other than Kentucky have recognized that a rule of enforce-
ment may be judicially mandated just as the old common law
rule was judicially created.47 The Kentucky legislature has in-
dicated a general state policy favoring arbitration by passing
the arbitration statutes and the Kentucky Supreme Court
should follow its lead. When a similar situation existed in Min-
nesota, the Supreme Court of Minnesota overruled all of its
prior decisions that had held agreements to arbitrate future
disputes void as against public policy, saying:
For this departure from a doctrine of long standing, we
make no apology .... It is enough that the legislature has
declared for arbitration, both statutory and common law.
That fixes the policy of this state for, rather than against,
arbitration. The apology should be rather for the regrettable
fact that our decision law did not promptly reflect the legisla-
tive declaration."
2. Broadly Interpreting the Kentucky Arbitration Statute
The second method of providing a legal rationale for the
enforcement of future arbitration agreements in Kentucky is to
read KRS § 417.010 as encompassing future as well as existing
46 Id. at 97. In addition, KRS § 417.018 (1972) allows courts to set aside arbitra-
tors' awards on equitable grounds.
" Notes and Comments, supra note 18, at 189 (footnotes omitted).
" Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, 296 N.W. 475, 478 (Minn.
.1941). The viability of a judicially created policy of enforcement has also been recog-
nized in United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing v. Stine, 351 P.2d
965, 978 (Nev. 1960).
[Vol. 67
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disputes. As discussed above,4 the Kentucky arbitration stat-
ute does not clearly resolve the issue of the enforceability of
future disputes clauses. The statutory requirement of stating
the matter to be submitted to arbitration would seem to indi-
cate that future disputes clauses are not to be enforced. How-
ever, arguably an agreement to submit all disputes arising out
of a contract satisfies the statute, even though such a state-
ment of subject matter is incredibly broad."0 If the Court held
that such a statement of the matter submitted was sufficient
under the statute, then the Court could legitimately enforce
future arbitration agreements pursuant to a statutory man-
date.
Using this rationale, future arbitration agreements could
be enforced without overruling older cases holding that future
disputes clauses are void as against public policy. The Court
need only recognize that the legislature had exercised its power
to supersede judicial interpretations of public policy. However,
such a rationale seems to sacrifice honesty and clarity at the
altar of stare decisis, since it is doubtful that the legislature
ever intended to change the common law policy regarding fu-
ture disputes clauses. In the one case in which KRS § 417.010
was considered in relation to a future disputes clause, a federal
court summarily dismissed the contention that the statute
mandated enforcement, instead applying the common law rule
to invalidate the agreement. 1 More significantly, in its Fite &
Warmath opinion the Supreme Court of Kentucky has as-
sumed that the statute does not apply to future disputes
clauses: "The legislature has adopted an arbitration statute,
Chapter 417 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. This Act em-
powers the parties to voluntarily submit an existing dispute to
the process of arbitration."52
Therefore, in the absence of additional clarification by the
legislature, use of this second rationale for enforcement is un-
likely. Nevertheless, speculation about the significance of legis-
lative inaction could prove attractive to the Court as an alter-
4' See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kentucky's
arbitration statute.
" Goldman, supra note 1, at 208.
' Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1944).
52 559 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
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native more palatable than overruling prior decisions which
embody the old common law rule.
3. 'Choice of Forum Clauses
The third possible theory for the validation of agreements
to arbitrate future disputes would be to enforce them as con-
tractual choice of forum clauses. This is the approach favored
by the Supreme Court in Fite & Warmath, with the Court
noting that no valid public policy of the state is violated by
giving effect to a reasonable agreement between the parties
regarding the forum for suits arising out of the contract and
that an arbitration agreement amounts to nothing more than
such a choice of forum clause."
Prior to Fite & Warmath even the validity of traditional
choice of forum clauses was suspect in Kentucky. The old com-
mon law policy on such clauses strongly resembles the rule on
the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Agreements which
purport to choose a forum for future disputes are often voided
as contrary to public policy,5 but agreements as to a forum for
an existing dispute are enforceable in a majority of jurisdic-
tions.5 The reason for such results, i.e., refusing to allow the
parties to oust a court of jurisdiction," and the trend away from
the old rule and toward a policy of across the board enforce-
ment of reasonable agreements," also resembles aspects of ar-
bitration agreements discussed earlier. While Kentucky has
never expressly adopted the old common law position on choice
of forum clauses, the many similarities to arbitration agree-
ments indicate the likelihood of a similar result. However, the
Fite & Warmath Court indicates that choice of forum clauses
are enforceable on the whole and disregards the old common
law rule, quoting with approval section 80 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws which states: "The parties' agree-
ment-as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial
jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless
" See id.
4 20 AM. JuR. 2d Courts § 141 (1965).
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300, 324 (1957).
" See Gilbert, supra note 32, at 12.
" See id. at 24, 71.
[Vol. 67
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it is unfair or unreasonable. 5 8
By viewing an arbitration agreement as "a specialized
kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of
the suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the
dispute,"5' and by adopting the modem view that forum-
selection clauses relating to future controversies are enforcea-
ble, the Court can in effect adopt the modern view on the
enforceability of future arbitration agreements. By applying
the dicta of Pite & Warmath, the Court can modernize state
policy on both future arbitration agreements and choice of
forum clauses.
If the Court does hold that future arbitration agreements
are enforceable as choice of forum clauses, the choice of forum
reasonableness rule"0 may then be applied to such arbitration
agreements. The main factors in this reasonableness test are:
(1) whether or not the plaintiff will be able to obtain "effective
relief" in the chosen forum; (2) whether or not the selected
forum is "substantially inconvenient;" (3) whether or not there
was any unconscionability in the making of the contract con-
taining the choice of forum clause; and, (4) whether or not
there were any other "elements of unreasonableness."'" In the
context of an arbitration agreement, the requirements of this
four pronged test seem to leave the parties considerable free-
dom in tailoring the agreement to their needs, while simultane-
ously protecting the parties from unfairness and overreaching.
In Fite & Warmath the Court hinted at the utility of at least
parts of the reasonableness test in the arbitration context by
mentioning that no unconscionability or adhesion was indi-
cated in the situation before the Court. 2
II. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION Acr IN KENTUCKY
The Fite & Warmath Court held that state courts must
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971), as quoted in Fite &
Warmath Constr. Co., 559 S.W.2d at 735.
, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (footnote omitted).
, The reasonableness rule is a qualification on choice of forum requiring that any
forum chosen must be reasonable before the clause will be upheld by the courts. See
Gilbert, supra note 32, at 14.
'I Gilbert, supra note 32, at 32-42. This article contains an excellent discussion of
the application of each of these factors.
12 559 S.W.2d at 735.
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apply the Federal Arbitration Act to a contract involving inter-
state commerce. This decision has great significance regarding
both the present enforceability of future arbitration agree-
ments in Kentucky and the interpretation of the scope of the
Federal Arbitration Act. To fully appreciate the significance of
this decision it is necessary to understand the history of conflict
and uncertainty which has surrounded the Federal Arbitration
Act.
A. Problems in Applying the Federal Arbitration Act to the
States
The Federal Arbitration Act" was enacted in 1925 and
basically provides that arbitration agreements in contracts in-
volving maritime transactions or interstate or foreign com-
merce are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."'" Originally it
was thought that the Act provided rules for only the federal
courts, based on Congress' power to regulate the inferior federal
courts." Between 1925 and 1938 this view remained unchal-
lenged, since the federal courts could apply the Act in any
maritime or commerce case coming before the court. Then in
1938 the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,66 requiring federal courts to
- 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
64 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). This section provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transac-
tion, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
The Act also provides judicial procedures for implementing arbitration agree-
ments such as stays of proceedings pending arbitration and order compelling arbitra-
tion. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1976).
For the legislative history of the United States Arbitration Act see Murphy &
Sturges, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States
Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 580, n.1 (1952).
65 "It has been suggested that the proposed law depends entirely for its validity
upon the exercise of the interstate-commerce and admirality powers of Congress. This
is not the fact. It rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is author-
ized to establish and control inferior Federal courts." Cohen & Dayton, The New
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. Rnv. 265, 275 (1926).
86 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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apply state substantive law in diversity cases. Erie left the
courts with three possibilities as to the applicability of the Act
in diversity cases: (1) the Federal Arbitration Act was proce-
dural, in which case the federal courts would apply the Act in
diversity cases; (2) the Act was substantive, in which case it
would yield to state law in cases based on diversity jurisdiction;
and (3) the Federal Arbitration Act was substantive, but was
based on Congress' power over commerce 7 and therefore ap-
plied to the states under the supremacy clause."
1. Solutions in the Federal Courts
One of the first cases dealing with the proper construction
to be given the Federal Arbitration Act arose in Kentucky."' In
this case, based on a contract between a Kentucky corporation
and a New York fiber broker for the shipment of fibers from
South America, the defendant claimed that a future arbitra-
tion clause in the contract could not be enforced against him
because it was invalid under Kentucky law.70 The district court
rejected this argument and opted for the third possibility out-
lined above for applying the Act because:
The contract here exhibited evidences a transaction in-
volving "commerce" which, as defined by the Act, "means
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations."
. . . The plenary power to regulate such commerce is com-
mitted to Congress....
Thus, legislating within its constitutional domain, Con-
gress has declared, as a matter of substantive law, that an
arbitration agreement such as that here in question, is valid
and enforceable [citation omitted].
The power of Congress to regulate such commerce by
National laws is paramount and the conflicting laws of a state
can not stand in the way of enforcement. 7
1
The United States Supreme Court cast some doubt on this
position with its decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
'" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
" U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
" Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills, 65 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1946), aff'd 206
F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953).
1' 65 F. Supp. at 602-03.
7, Id. at 603.
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America."2 In Bernhardt the Court held that state law governed
an arbitration clause because the contract which contained the
clause did not evidence a transaction in interstate commerce.
The major uncertainty was caused by Justice Frankfurter's
statement in a concurring opinion that the Federal Arbitration
Act was inapplicable in diversity cases, 7 and by the majority's
suggestion that Erie may have affected the applicability of the
Act in diversity cases.7" While the Bernhardt majority left open
the question of whether the Act could be applied at all in diver-
sity cases, the tone of the opinion suggested that the Court may
not approve such an application.
The Courts of Appeals, however, disagreed with Justice
Frankfurter's advice, and in the cases of Robert Lawrence Co.
v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.75 and American Airlines, Inc. v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Air Board"8 held that although
the Federal Arbitration Act was substantive in nature,7' state
law must yield to it in a diversity case. In both cases the courts
found that the Federal Act was based on the power of Congress
over commerce7 and that the intent of Congress in passing the
Act was "to overrule by legislation long-standing judicial
precedent, which declared agreements to submit judiciable
controversies to arbitration contrary to public policy, on the
ground that enforcement of such agreements would oust the
courts of their jurisdiction."7
-2 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
I "Since the United States Arbitration Act of 1925 does not obviously apply to
diversity cases, in the light of its terms and the relevant interpretative materials,
avoidance of the constitutional question is for me sufficiently compelling to lead to a
construction of the Act as not applicable to diversity cases." Id. at 208 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
11 Id. at 202.
75 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed
per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
7, 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959).
" In fact the Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence went so far as to say: ' bis [the
Federal Arbitration Act] is a declaration of national law equally applicable in state
or federal courts." 271 F.2d at 407.
Is Id.; American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d
811, 815 (6th Cir. 1959).
71 American Airlines, Inc., 269 F.2d at 816.
A similar statement is made in the Robert Lawrence case:
"Suffice it to say for a considerable time prior to the passage of the Arbitra-
tion Act in 1925 the Congress had come to the conclusion that an effort
[Vol. 67
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Finally, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manu-
facturing Co.,"0 a diversity case involving a dispute about an
arbitration agreement again reached the United States Su-
preme Court. Here, unlike Bernhardt, the contract containing
the arbitration clause did involve a transaction in interstate
commerce." In ruling that federal courts must apply the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act in diversity cases, the Court adopted the
conclusion of the Robert Lawrence and American Airlines
courts that the commerce power of Congress necessitates appli-
cation of the Act in diversity cases.8"
The Court, after an extensive review of the legislative his-
tory, determined that the Federal Arbitration Act was based on
the interstate commerce power of Congress,83 even though Jus-
tice Black reached an opposite conclusion from a similar re-
view.8" After Prima Paint, therefore, federal courts must treat
the Act as substantive federal law applicable to the states, thus
applying the Act in diversity cases as well as those which in-
volve a federal question.85
should be made t6 legislate on the subject of arbitration in such a fashion as
to remove the hostility of the judiciary and make the benefits of arbitration
generally available to the business world."
271 F.2d at 406-07 (footnote omitted).
See also Notes and Comments, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United
States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69
YALE L.J. 847 (1960) for a further discussion of the American Airlines and Robert
Lawrence cases.
" 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
"Id. at 401.
U Id. at 405.
Id. at 405 n.13.
u Id. at 418-20 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was of the opinion that
Congress based the Federal Arbitration Act on its power to create rules for the federal
courts and was not trying to create substantive federal law. Id.
" Since Prima Paint the federal courts have consistently applied the Federal
Arbitration Act in diversity cases involving commerce or maritime transactions. See
Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1976); Medical Dev. Corp. v. In-
dustrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1973); Varley v. Tarrytown Associates,
Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995
(8th Cir. 1972); Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 397 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1968),
enforcing, 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1967); TAC Travel America Corp. v. World Airways,
Inc., 443 F.Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Avila Group, Inc. v. Norma J. of Cal., 426
F.Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); John Ashe Associates, Inc. v. Envirogenics Co., 425
F.Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Warren Bros. Co. v. Community Bldg. Corp. of Atlanta,
386 F.Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 376
F.Supp. 579 (E.D.Pa. 1974), affl'd, Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Pa. Turnpike
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2. The Federal Arbitration Act in State Courts
While Prima Paint decided that the federal courts were to
apply the Act both in diversity and non-diversity cases, it did
not determine how state courts were to handle the Act in cases
brought before them."6 Justice Black in his dissent in Prima
Paint thought the majority did not hold that the Act was re-
quired to be applied by the state courts, and he criticized the
resulting discrimination.17 Yet, it is not clear whether the ma-
jority intended to allow the state courts to disregard the Act,
intended to reserve the question for future decision, or intended
that the Act be applied by the state courts.8 Indeed, Prima
Paint may be interpreted to stand for the sole proposition that
the Federal Arbitration Act was a legislatively created excep-
tion to Erie, in which case the effect of the Act on state courts
has yet to be determined by the Supreme Court.89
Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975); C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp.
for Housing Partnerships, 375 F.Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Erving v. Virgnia Squires
Basketball Club, 349 F.Supp. 716 (E.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972);
Austin v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 349 F.Supp. 615 (M.D.Fla. 1972); Bartell Media
Corp. v. Fawcett Printing Corp., 342 F.Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
1 Several lower federal courts, however, have indicated that state courts should
apply the Act when interstate commerce or maritime transactions are involved. See,
e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960);
Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Producing Properties, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 956, 959
(S.D. Tex. 1962).
" 388 U.S. at 424-25. Justice Black thought that requiring the state courts to
apply the Federal Arbitration Act would "flout the intention of the framers of the Act."
He reasoned:
Yet under this Court's opinion today-that the Act supplies not only the
remedy of enforcement but a body of federal doctrines to determine the
validity of an arbitration agreement-failure to make the Act applicable in
state courts would give rise to "forum shopping" and an unconstitutional
discrimination that both Erie and Bernhardt were designed to eliminate.
Id.
Justice Black's solution was to limit the Act to "the mere enforcement in federal
courts of valid arbitration agreements." Id. at 425.
u The transcript of the arguments before the Supreme Court indicates that the
respondents, who were claiming the application of the Federal Act, and the American
Arbitration Association, who appeared as amicus curiae, thought the state courts
would have to apply the Federal Act, and so responded to questions from the Supreme
Court. See Coulson, Prima Paint: An Arbitration Milestone, 23 Bus. LAWYER 241, 247
(1967).
" Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Reply Brief for Appellant at 6, Reply Brief of Appel-
lant to Reply Brief of Appellee at 5, Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp. 559
S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).
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Since Prima Paint did not expressly confront the issue of
applicability at the state level, state courts have been left to
determine the scope of the Act for themselves. If the state
courts hold that they need not apply the federal Act it would
"(1) permit, indeed encourage, forum shopping; (2) prevent
and undermine the need for nationwide uniformity in the inter-
pretation and application of arbitration clauses in foreign and
interstate transactions; and (3) permit individuals to circum-
vent the national law relating to arbitration agreements as
called for by the F.A.A."90 On the other hand, if the state courts
do apply the Act they must also determine which parts of the
Act are substantive federal laws and to what extent the courts
can apply state procedural rules."
The majority of state courts that have dealt with this issue
have applied the Federal Arbitration Act at the state level.9
With the decision in Fite & Warmath Kentucky joined this
majority." The Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that state
courts and federal courts must evenly apply the federal Act to
prevent forum shopping in derogation of the policy behind the
Erie doctrine. 4 So far only one state-Delaware5 -has refused
to apply the Federal Arbitration Act, with a Delaware appel-
"Rederi v. Dow Chem. Corp., 255 N.E.2d 774, 776 (N.Y. 1970).
" See Note, The Federal Arbitration Act in State Courts: Converse Erie Problems,
55 CoRNuL L. Rxv. 623, 625 (1970).
32 See Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 136 Cal. Rptr. 378
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Indus., Inc., 201 S.E.2d
452 (Ga. 1973); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 239 S.E.2d 401 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1977); University Casework Systems, Inc. v. Bahre, 362 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1977); Pathman Constr. Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.E.2d 844 (ind.
Ct. App. 1975); Rederi v. Dow Chem. Corp., 255 N.E.2d 774 (N.Y. 1970); Episcopal
Hous. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1977); Miller v. Puritan Fashions
Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); REA Express v. Missouri Pacific R.R.,
447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751
(Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
11 As the Kentucky Supreme Court stated: "We, therefore, hold that the provi-
sions of the U.S. Arbitration Act of 1925 apply to actions brought in the courts of this
state where the purpose of the action is to enforce voluntary arbitration agreements in
contracts evidencing transactions in interstate commerce." Fite & Warmath Constr.
Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Ky. 1977).
" Id. at 733.
" See Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
This case involved a future disputes clause in a contract for the construction of a melt
shop for steel production. Id. at 335-36. The common law of Delaware would not
specifically enforce future disputes clauses. Id. at 338-39.
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late court holding that Prima Paint made the Act a legisla-
tively created exception to Erie, effective only in federal court
and not binding on the states.96 However, the continued valid-
ity of the decision is speculative at best, since the case was not
reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court and since Delaware
now applies the Uniform Arbitration Act97 which, like the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, provides for enforcement of future arbitra-
tion agreements. Thus, the weight of authority holds that the
provisions of the federal Act will be applied by state courts.9"
The decision in Fite & Warmath has further significance
in that Kentucky courts must now enforce future arbitration
agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act which were
unenforceable under state law. Seven other states99 have held
the federal Act applicable in state courts, but most of these
states had previously adopted modern arbitration statutes
which provided for the enforcement of future disputes clauses
regardless of the federal Act."' Therefore, Kentucky joins a
small minority of states which has significantly departed from
established state law by applying the federal Act, at least in
the area of future arbitration agreements.
U Id. at 338.
" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701-25 (1974).
H This is significant not only in that it will prevent forum shopping but also
because state courts are the only forum for some cases which meet the requirements
for application of the federal Arbitration Act but do not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements for federal courts. These cases include diversity cases where the $10,000
jurisdictional amount established in 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1966) is not met and non-
diversity cases regardless of the amount in controversy, since it has consistently been
held that the federal Act does not provide an independent ground for federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1966). See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Ter-
minal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d cir. 1959), cert.
granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Krass
Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons., Inc., 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1933);
Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 579, 585 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd
Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975);
Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Producing Properties, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 956, 959
(S.D. Tex. 1962). Therefore, even though an action may be based on a federal stat-
ute-the U.S. Arbitration Act-and satisfy the jurisdictional minimum, it will not be
heard in federal court without some other basis for jurisdiction.
" See note 92 supra for a list of these states.
' See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1972); IND. CODE § 34-4-2-1 (1976);
N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1963); Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224
(Vernon 1973); WASH. REv. CODE § 7.04.010 (1976).
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However, Kentucky is not alone in subrogating prior state
law to the federal Act. For example, Georgia does not have a
modem arbitration statute'01 and under its common law, agree-
ments to arbitrate "all issues" are void as against public pol-
icy. 10 Yet the Georgia Supreme Court applied the Federal Ar-
bitration Act to uphold a broad arbitration agreement, finding
that the Act superseded the old common law rule.,0 3 In addi-
tion, in South Carolina, where general arbitration agreements
are unenforceable under state law,"0 4 the highest state court
applied the federal Act to uphold a general agreement.0 5
B. Requirements for Application of the Federal Arbitration
Act-What is "Commerce"?
Section 2 of the U.S. Arbitration Act, which makes future
arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,"
applies only to "any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce."'0 1 Probably the
most important of these two alternative conditions for the ap-
plication of the Act is the requirement that the transaction
involve "commerce." "Commerce" is further defined to include
both interstate and foreign commerce.' However, because the
"I See GA. CODE § 7-101 to 7-224 (1973). For a complete discussion of the Georgia
law on arbitration see Note, Commercial Arbitration in Georgia, 12 GA. L. REv. 323
(1978).
11 West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Indus., Inc., 201 S.E.2d 452, 454 (Ga.
1973).
'1 Id. However, the court also recognized that the arbitration agreement at issue
in this case would have been valid under Georgia law because it limited the arbitration
to questions of implied warranty and price and the Georgia policy against arbitration
only went to agreements to arbitrate "all questions." Id.
In a later case the Court of Appeals of Georgia, citing West Point, also applied
the Federal Arbitration Act to an arbitration agreement otherwise unenforceable under
Georgia law. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 239 S.E.2d 401, 403
(Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
It is also interesting to note that under the Georgia common law future arbitration
agreements are not enforceable. Note, supra note 101, at 325-26. Therefore, the Federal
Act may be applied in Georgia, as in Kentucky, to enforce future arbitration agree-
ments that would not be enforceable under state law.
I" Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647, 649 (S.C. 1977).
'i Id.
'" 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See note 64 supra for the text of this section.
"' 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides:
"Maritime transaction", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills
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Act contains no indication as to what constitutes interstate or
foreign commerce, the courts have been forced to formulate
their own definition.
The courts have never precisely defined the limits of inter-
state commerce,' 8 instead confronting the issue on a case by
.case basis.'0' Nevertheless, recent decisions under the Act indi-
cate that: "The case law definition of transactions involving
commerce to which Title 9 [the Federal Arbitration Act] is
applicable is broad and includes trade generally between citi-
zens of the several states, including the purchase and sale of
property of all kinds and descriptions.""' This wide-ranging
interpretation of "interstate commerce" was not so favorably
received in the past."' However, the modem trend appears to
be toward such a liberal interpretation. In addition, at least one
judge has suggested that the requirement of the statute that
of lading or water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies fur-
nished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign
commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be embraced within
admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein defined, means commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory
and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation,
or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.
"I This discussion is limited primarily to "interstate" as distinguished from
"foreign" commerce because that is the area with which most of the cases are con-
cerned. However, it is important to remember that the Federal Arbitration Act also
applies when the transaction is maritime or involves foreign commerce.
I" In fact, the courts seem to avoid applying any "black letter" rule to determine
when there is interstate commerce. As is noted in American Jurisprudence:
"Interstate commerce" is not a technical legal conception, but a practi-
cal one drawn from the course of business, and what falls within it must be
determined upon consideration of established facts and known commercial
methods; there is no single concept of interstate commerce which can be
applied to every federal statute regulating commerce. It has been pointed out
that "interstate commerce" is a term of such wide implications and ramifica-
tions that the courts have carefully avoided any attempt to give it a compre-
hensive definition (footnotes omitted).
15A Am. JUR. 2d Commerce § 4 (1976).
1" C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375
F.Supp. 446, 451 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
"I See note 123 and accompanying text infra for cases using a restrictive interpre-
tation of interstate commerce.
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the contract evidence a transaction involving commerce meant
that the contract had to show on its face that the parties con-
templated a transaction in interstate commerce.11 2 Modem
courts, nevertheless, generally examine both the face of the
contract and the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether interstate commerce is involved.
113
Interstate contacts sufficient to apply the Act have been
found in at least three discernible categories. First, interstate
commerce sufficient to apply the Act has been found in cases
involving contracts for the shipment of goods across state lines.
For example, the Federal Arbitration Act has been applied to
contracts involving the shipment of computer parts from Mich-
igan to Texas,1 4 the delivery of clothes from New York to Cali-
fornia,115 transporting a car from Illinois to California,' 6 and
the shipment of wool from New York to Massachusetts.11 7 Inter-
state commerce is most clearly involved in transactions such as
these. Second, sufficient interstate commerce has been found
where the business involves multi-state transactions other than
the shipment of goods. These cases include employment con-
tracts with interstate connections,"8 franchise contracts be-
112 See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d
Cir.) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
,"I See, e.g., Legg, Mason & Coe, Inc. v. Mackall & Co., 351 F.Supp. 1367, 1371
(D.D.C. 1972); Kirschner v. West Co., 185 F.Supp. 317, 319 (E.D.Pa. 1960), appeal
dismissed, 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962).
"I Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972).
", Avila Group, Inc. v. Norma J. of Cal., 426 F.Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
' Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. Newman, 356 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
I" Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
"I E.g., Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1976); Varley v. Tarry-
town Associates, Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973); Miller v. Puritan Fashions Corp.,
516 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
Compare Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F.Supp. 716 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) with Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co., 163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947) to see how the
concept of interstate commerce has expanded over the years.
Another issue in employment cases is the extent to which the employment con-
tracts exclusion in § 1 of the Act is to be applied. See note 107 supra for the text of §
1. While older cases like Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944), used
the § 1 exclusion to avoid applying the Act, the more recent cases have tended to
circumvent the exclusion. See Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F.Supp.
1367 (D.D.C. 1972); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F.Supp. 716
(E.D.N.Y.) affd, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
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tween residents of different states,' and certain contracts for
securities or commodities. 2 ' Finally, courts have found suffi-
cient interstate commerce to apply the Act to construction con-
tracts which involve materials, equipment, employees, or re-
lated parties from more than one state. It is not clear exactly
how many of these factors a construction contract must involve
before the courts find that it evidences a transaction in inter-
state commerce. Courts have found sufficient interstate com-
merce if both some employees and materials come from other
states,'2' while at least one court has held that a list of out of
state sources of materials in the contract evidenced interstate
commerce on the face of the contract.2 2 However, some courts
have found that local construction contracts did not involve
interstate commerce, without even examining the sources of
employees or supplies.1
23
The Kentucky position on the minimum requisites of in-
terstate commerce is difficult to ascertain because of the vari-
ety of substantial interstate contracts involved in Fite &
Warmath. 21 The Fite & Warmath contract as outlined by the
"I E.g., Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn, 357 F.Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Cooper v. Computer Credit Systems, Inc., 336 N.Y.S.2d 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
But see In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 F.Supp. 992 (W.D.Pa. 1935), which held that
a contract for a license or patent did not involve interstate commerce. The significance
of this case is questionable since it relied in part on the interstate commerce reasoning
of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) which was overruled by United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
11 E.g., Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535 (D. Neb. 1976); Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 239 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
121 See, e.g., John Ashe Assocs. Inc. v. Envirogenics Co., 425 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Pathman Constr. Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.E.2d 844 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1975). Of course, if employees, materials, and some additional equipment or
parties, e.g., sureties or architects, come from other states the probability is even
stronger that interstate commerce exists to an extent sufficient to apply the Act. See,
e.g., Warren Bros.Co. v. Community Bldg. Corp. of Atlanta, 386 F. Supp. 656
(M.D.N.C. 1974); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Glenwal Co., 325 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
'" Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1977).
13 See Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 1947);
McDonough Constr. Co. of Fla. v. Harmer, 232 F. Supp. 887, 890 (M.D.N.C. 1964);
W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst., 113 F. Supp. 564, 571
(E.D. Ark. 1953).
IU Eighty percent of the sub-contractors were from out of the state, many employ-
ees commuted from Tennessee, the architects and financier were from New York, and
the majority of the tenants of the mall were both incorporated and had their principle
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Court did not involve materials from out of state, indicating
that where other substantial interstate connections exist, inter-
state shipment of materials is not essential to application of the
Act. The Court mentioned that "[t]he United States Supreme
Court,. . . adopted a broad definition of the sort of transaction
which would constitute a contract evidencing a transaction in
interstate commerce." ' s In addition, the Court rejected the
argument that a contract for local construction was not com-
merce. 12 However, a more precise definition of what constitutes
interstate commerce for the purposes of the Federal Arbitration
Act in Kentucky must await further litigation.
III. OTHER CASES ON REMEDIES
A. Apportionment Between Joint Tortfeasors-Rejection of
the Pro Tanto Credit Rule
The pro tanto credit rule is a long established doctrine'2
providing that "[t]he consideration received by one injured as
a consequence of a tort committed by two or more tortfeasors
operates to reduce, pro tanto, the amount of damages he is
entitled to recover against any other tortfeasor responsible for
his injuries, .... "1 The doctrine originated to prevent over-
compensation of an injured party. 2 For example, if the injured
party settled with joint tortfeasor "A" for $3,000 and later in a
suit against joint tortfeasor "B" it was found that the plaintiff
was damaged to the extent of $4,000 of which "B" was liable
for 50%, i.e., $2,000, then the injured party ends up with $5,000
($3,000 from "A" and $2,000 from "B"), which is $1,000 more
than the amount of damage suffered. The pro tanto credit rule
would credit the extra $1,000 paid by "A" to the amount owed
by "B" so that "B" would only have to pay $1,000 and the
place of business outside of Kentucky. Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp.,
559 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Ky. 1977).
" Id. at 734.
"' Id.
" An early Kentucky case applying this rule is Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Beaucond, 224 S.W. 179, 186-87 (Ky. 1920).
' 22 AM. Jun. 2d Damages § 205 (1965). See also W. PRossFn, TORTS § 49, at 304-
05 (4th ed. 1971).
IN D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. CA-799-MR, slip op. at 2
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1977), reo'd, 569 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. 1978).
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plaintiff would end up with $4,000-the amount of his or her
damages.
Application of the pro tanto credit rule was recently re-
jected by the Kentucky Supreme Court in the case of D.D.
Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp.'3 In that case the
plaintiff, Williamson, had settled with one defendant, PB&S
Chemical Co., for $16,500 on a claim for damages from the sale
of a defective chemical. At trial against Allied, the remaining
defendant, a joint tortfeasor, the jury fouhd that the plaintiff
had sustained damages of $20,000 and that each tortfeasor was
liable for half. 3' The trial judge had applied the pro tanto
credit rule and held Allied liable for only $3,500. This award
was upheld by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the pro
tanto credit rule should be applied in light of Orr v. Coleman3 2
and the Kentucky apportionment statute.' At common law
there was no apportionment of damages between joint tortfea-
sors and each was liable for the whole amount, until this rule
was changed by KRS § 454.040.34 The Williamson Court recog-
nized that because the pro tanto credit rule was based on the
discarded common law principle of joint liability for joint tort-
feasors the policy reasons for it were no longer valid.1rs In the
Orr case, which involved the issue of whether the amount of
settlement by one joint tortfeasor should be used in determin-
's 569 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. 1978).
'" Id. at 673.
" 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970).
'' KRS § 454.040 (1975). This section provides:
In actions of trespass the jury may assess joint or several damages
against the defendants. When the jury finds several damages, the judgment
shall be in favor of the plaintiff against each defendant for the several dam-
ages, without regard to the amount of damages claimed in the petition, and
shall include a joint judgment for the costs.
Although this refers to "actions of trespass" it has consistently been held to apply to
negligence actions for personal injuries. Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970).
For a discussion of the Kentucky apportionment statute see generally Germain,
Remedies: Contribution and Apportionment Among "Joint Tortfeasors,'" 65 Ky. L. J.
285, 291-94 (1976).
'u Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Ky. 1959).
,u See D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 569 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Ky.
1978).
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ing the amount of damages owed by the other joint tortfeasor,
the Court held that each tortfeasor's liability should be based
on his or her contribution to the causation of the damage. The
Court provided for such apportionment as follows:
[T]he jury should be required to assess the total amount of
the claimant's damages and fix the proportionate share of the
nonsettling tortfeasor's liability on the basis of his contribu-
tion to the causation. The trial court may then compute the
amount of the judgment to be entered against the nonsettling
tortfeasor, thus fixing his ultimate liability (and incidentally
obviating any question of or necessity for contribution).,
The suggestion in the last sentence that some computation
was necessary, even though there was no contribution, 37 argua-
bly meant that the pro tanto credit rule applied.
However, the Court in Williamson noted that the policy
favoring settlement would be thwarted if the non-settling party
received a credit for any amounts paid by the settling joint
tortfeasor. "To now allow Allied to benefit from PB&S's gener-
osity discourages the policy of encouraging and finalizing par-
tial settlements.1 ' 38 The holding in Orr was based on the policy
of encouraging settlements 9 and the Court refused to interpret
Orr in such a way as to thwart that policy. The settlement
between Williamson and PB&S was final only as to them and
had no effect on the liability of Allied.
Allowing Williamson to retain the benefit of the bargain
with PB&S is only fair since Williamson also carried the risk
of a bad bargain. If the settlement with PB&S had been for less
than what the jury apportioned, Allied would not have been
obligated to pay Williamson the difference, since under Orr
there was no need for contribution when the award was made
"severally."'' " The pro tanto credit rule places all of the risks
'1 Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970).
'7 D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. CA-799-MR, slip op. at 5
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1977) (Howerton, J., dissenting), rev'd, 569 S.W.2d 672 (Ky.
1978).
II 569 S.W.2d at 674.
,' Id.; see Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970).
" D.D. Williamson & Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. CA-799-MR, slip op. at 3
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1977) (Howerton, J., dissenting), rev'd, 569 S.W.2d 672 (Ky.
1978).
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of settlement on the plaintiff without any of the benefits. As
the Court said: "We conclude in this case that the same policy
[favoring settlements] militates in favor of allowing the plain-
tiff to enjoy a favorable settlement or being bound by a poor
settlement."141
B. The "First Blush" Test and the Excessiveness of Damages
for Mental Anguish
For many years the Kentucky courts have used the "first
blush" rule to determine whether or not an award of damages
was excessive. 42 The rule has been stated that "the test of
excessiveness of a damage verdict is whether the award is so
great as to strike the mind at first blush as being the result of
passion and prejudice.' '4 The Kentucky Supreme Court re-
viewed and applied this rule in the case of Wilson v. Redken
Laboratories, Inc. 144
The Wilson case involved the question of whether damages
of $30,000 were excessive for "past, present, and future mental
anguish" due to the loss of plaintiffs hair from using Redken
products.' The plaintiff, Louise Wilson, had gone to her beau-
tician to have her hair frosted. The beautician and later a
representative of Redken applied a number of Redken products
to Ms. Wilson's hair, as a result of which her hair began break-
ing off. She had to purchase and constantly wear wigs. The
evidence showed that Ms. Wilson was greatly distressed and
would even wear a wig to bed to keep her family from seeing
the condition of her hair.
4
The Court of Appeals ruled that the $30,000 award for
", 569 S.W.2d at 674.
,,2 See Great Lakes Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc. v. Hightower, 163 F.2d 1016 (6th
Cir. 1947); Townsend v. Stamper, 398 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Ky. 1965); Ballard v. King, 373
S.W.2d 591, 593 (Ky. 1963); Lyon v. Prater, 351 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky. 1961); Koch v.
Stone, 332 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Ky. 1960); Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Matracia, 311
S.W.2d 565, 567 (Ky. 1958); Spot Cash Tobacco Co. v. Pike, 264 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Ky.
1954); Welch v. Jenkins, 227 S.W. 798, 800 (Ky. 1921); New Bell Jellico Coal Co. v.
Sowders, 172 S.W. 914, 917 (Ky. 1915); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Long, 22 S.W. 747,
749 (Ky. 1893).
3 Townsend v. Stamper, 398 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Ky. 1965).
"1 562 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1978).
" Id. at 634.
14 Id. at 635.
[Vol. 67
KENTUCKY LAW SuRVEY
mental anguish "struck the mind at 'first blush,' as having
been given under the influence of passion and prejudice," par-
ticularly when the plaintiff had suffered no pain or loss of earn-
ings. 147 The Supreme Court found otherwise, noting that the
humiliation, mortification, and the "pain of embarrassment"
were sufficient to show that the plaintiff had suffered mental
anguish. "8 The Court concluded:
It is this court's opinion that the "first blush" rule used by
the courts as it relates to excessive damages simply means
that the judicial mind immediately is shocked and surprised
at the great disproportion of the size of the verdict to that
which evidence in the case would authorize.
In light of the evidence presented to the jury this court
is unable to say that the judicial mind would have its consci-
ence shocked at the size of the verdict under consideration
when viewed in light of the testimony."'
Evidently it takes an extremely egregious award for the Court
to "blush" at the excessiveness. 5 '
Jillena A. Warner
11 Id. at 634.
i' Id. at 635-36.
, Id. at 636-37. Cf. Slusher v. Miracle, 382 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1964) and Roland v.
Murray, 239 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1951) where great deference was given to the interpreta-
tion by the jury and the facts of the particular case in determining whether an award
was excessive.
1 The author wishes to thank Professors Kenneth B. Germain and Alvin L. Gold-
man, University of Kentucky College of Law, for their help in the preparation of this
article.
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